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Analysis of Eastern Europe as it pertains to U.S. Psychological Strategy

I. National Objectives

Psychological strategy in Eastern Europe must be compatible with over-all United States foreign policy which has as its primary objective the preservation of U.S. security preferably by means short of war. At the present time the major threat to this security comes from the Soviet Union and its satellites, which can marshal against us not only large manpower and material resources but also has an additional weapon--dynamic Communist ideology.

The greatest single obstacle to the attainment of a decisive victory in the cold war in Eastern Europe is the presence of powerful contingents of the Red Army in East Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Until the Red Army can be induced to withdraw or can be neutralized as an instrument of Soviet policy, both in the satellites and in Russia, cold war psychological warfare activities alone cannot achieve enduring liberation of the peoples of the Eastern European satellites or the U.S.S.R.

The immediate aim of United States foreign policy, therefore, is to balance the power of the Soviet Union and its satellites with at least equal power in the U.S. and her allies. To date this has been attempted through a policy of containment. In the future, however, it is believed that a more dynamic cold war program, aggressively and vigorously prosecuted, is required to reach our goals. This dynamic policy should be designed to throw the Russians off balance by various psychological operations throughout the world and to force them to react to measures initiated by this nation and its allies rather than as in the past when the Western World has been reacting to situations created by the Russians.

This new policy is to be aimed at winning the cold war in the sense of establishing a preponderance of western power in the face of dynamic and aggressive activity on the part of the Soviet Union. It should be borne in mind, in view of our immediate objective of preserving the security of the United States short of war, that it could be disastrous to be too precipitate in the cold war. By being too precipitate we mean the accomplishment of local coups within the satellites or the U.S.S.R. which do not greatly weaken the power of the Soviet Union but so seriously threaten its security or so involve its prestige as to leave it no choice but to wage the war we are seeking to avoid. Furthermore, the successful accomplishment of this cold war program is contingent upon the development and maintenance of solidarity and cohesive strength of the western powers. Difficulty experienced to date in the development of a unified effort on the part of the western European countries and the lack of agreement among countries of the western hemisphere in the sphere of international

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objectives are but typical examples of the problems to be faced in developing a concerted program in the west. These problems will be magnified in direct ratio to the success of western efforts in tipping the balance of power from the Soviet bloc. As Western strength increases and the threat of the Soviet orbit is diminished, tendencies to diverge on policy and economic matters will certainly develop among the Western powers. This is particularly true of the weaker partners to the Western Alliance who will, at the earliest opportunity, seek relief from the severe economic strains occasioned by their rearmament contributions.

Although the objectives set forth above deal only with the prosecution of the cold war, we must be ever mindful of the real possibility that hot war may come at any time. U.S. efforts to achieve these objectives, therefore, must be prosecuted in such manner as to enable us successfully to wage hot war if the need arises. Conversely, we must be careful that preoccupation with hot war readiness does not prejudice the basic purposes and strategy of the cold war.

II. Missions and General Tasks

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[REDACTED] two major missions in Europe both of which are aimed at developing or maintaining the balance of power between the West and the Soviet bloc. The first mission is the consolidation of anti-Soviet attitudes in non-Soviet areas. The second is to harass and disrupt the satellites and the U.S.S.R. itself with the aim of making them insecure as bases for launching military offensives and to reduce their effectiveness in launching political offensives against the West.

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A. Primary Mission [REDACTED]

Within our capabilities our most important task in the consolidation of anti-Soviet attitudes in non-Soviet areas is the conduct of a psychological campaign supporting the integration of western German resources into the western European defense community. As a supplementary, but less important, element to this program, we must seek to strengthen the western orientation of Austria and Switzerland.

1. West Germany

a. Objectives. The integration of West Germany into the Western European defense system is vital to the successful development of Western military power sufficient to balance and deter the power of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, West Germany, through its ties to East Germany, can provide us with our most accessible and secure base for driving a psychological salient behind the Iron Curtain to weaken Soviet offensive capabilities.

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
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Austria

a. Objectives. Austria is less important to U.S. strategy than Germany, yet its preservation in the Western camp is important to protect Germany's southern flank, and to prevent the extension of Soviet influence into the heart of Western Europe. The prevailing immediate U.S. objectives for Austria are at least to maintain the present Western political orientation of the country, to minimize the benefits being derived from the country by the Soviet Union, and to avoid provocations that might induce a Soviet partition of the country. The long-range U.S. aim is to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet forces through the conclusion of an Austrian treaty.

b. Obstacles. The principal obstacles to even the maintenance of the status quo in Austria are the economic weaknesses of the country, aggravated by Soviet economic exploitation; Soviet physical control of the eastern population centers and most important economic areas; and the traditional political apathy of the Austrian people, intensified by their desire to avoid partition.

c. Programs and Methods. The U.S. Government should continue to provide economic assistance to Austria and should facilitate the expansion of Western markets for Austrian products. At the same time, U.S. policy should continue to push for the conclusion of a liberal Austrian treaty.

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2. Switzerland

a. Objectives. Switzerland is the least strategic of our division's areas, being strongly anti-Communist and geographically removed from direct contact with the Soviet bloc. Our principal cold war objective for Switzerland is therefore to minimize the economic benefits that the Soviets can derive from trade and financial dealings with Switzerland. In addition, in preparation for the contingency of general war, we should attempt to induce Switzerland to participate in the bolstering of Western European defenses.

b. Obstacles. The chief obstacle to U.S. objectives is Switzerland's deep-rooted and traditional policy of neutrality, which inhibits overt official partiality toward the West in comparison with the East in economic and military matters.

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